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1. Introduction
For many years, new and small-medium sized firms in Japan listed on an 
OTC market established by the Japan Securities Dealers Association in 1963. 
The market was reestablished as the JASDAQ market in 2001.  Two new OTC 
markets, Mothers and NASDAQ Japan, began operations in 1999 and 2000, 
respectively, to help provide venture companies with an easier alternative source 
of funding.  Mothers was established by the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) on 
November 11, 1999 and the NASDAQ Japan Market (NASDAQ-J ) opened 
on the Osaka Securities Exchange on June 19, 2000.  NASDAQ-J was funded 
by NASDAQ (US), Softbank Corp., and thirteen leading securities firms. 
NASDAQ-J closed and stocks now trade on the Hecules OTC market from late 
2002.  
This note empirically documents the performance of stock returns for 
IPOs on Mothers and NASDAQ-J.(1)  Several studies have investigated IPOs in 
Japan, however, most of these studies have focused on large exchanges such 
as the Tokyo Stock Exchange as opposed to the OTC market.  Early studies 
include Hiraki (1985) which looked at the “hot” issue phenomena of IPOs and 
Hiraki and Hebner (1993) which examine the determinants of initial returns in 
the context of the deliberate underpricing hypothesis.  More recently, Fukuda 
and Serita (1994) and Hwang and Jayaraman (1995) examine the long run 
performance of IPOs on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  Cai and Wei (1997) look at 
the long run investment and operating performance of Japanese IPOs.
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Other studies have turned to a specific regulatory issue or institutional 
details in order to better understand IPO pricing in Japan.  Pettway and Kaneko 
(1996) look at the impact of the change in pricing regulations.  Both Hamao, 
Packer, and Ritter (2000), and  Beckman, Garner, Marshall, and Okamura (2001) 
investigate the role keiretsu affiliation in the underpricing of Japanese IPOs.
2.  Data 
The sample in this study includes companies that went public by listing 
on Mothers and NASDAQ-J between December 1999 and August 2002. 
Descriptive statistics for the 127 IPO firms are found in Table 1.  We collected 
data on the daily closing prices for the sample of IPO firms primarily from 
Bloomberg.  Since many of the IPO firms on both Mothers and NASDAQ-J 
have undertaken stock splits after listing, all the data are adjusted for those 
splits. The daily closing prices for the three stock indices, TOPIX, Nikkei 225, 
and JASDAQ Index, were obtained through the Bloomberg database and the 
Yahoo Finance internet website.  Other information about various attributes of 
IPO firms such as the date of incorporation, the industry, the total proceeds from 
the IPO, etc. were obtained from the database on the official websites of both 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange and NASDAQ-J.  The sample period is December 
1999-August 2002 for Mothers and June 2000-August 2002 for NASDAQ-J.
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics
    Standard
   Mean Deviation Min. Max. Sample
Mothers
Initial Return  0.392   1.043  -0.755   3.693 36
Proceeds (billion yen) 7.627  21.521   0.150 128.0 36
Age of Firm (years) 8.571  7.136   0.808 32.083 36
NASDAQ J
Initial Return  0.553  1.022  -0.827 6.043 91
Proceeds (billion yen) 3.919  8.278   0.002 54.00 91
Age of Firm (years) 12.759  11.411   0.991 52.647 91
Total
Initial Return  0.507  1.027  -0.827 6.043 127
Proceeds (billion yen) 4.971  13.431   0.002 128.00 127
Age of Firm (years) 11.572 10.523   0.808 52.647 127
We exclude IPO stocks that lack 5 or more consecutive daily closing prices. 
For the IPO firms that do not have daily closing prices up to 4 trading days, 
we substituted the previous trading day’s closing prices for the missing data. 
Those IPOs without daily closing prices within the first three days of trading are 
excluded from the sample. 
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3. Aftermarket Performance
The aftermarket returns for each firm are calculated over an 18 week post 
listing time interval.  The aftermarket return in event week t is defined as
rit = (pit – pit-1) /pit-1,  
for t = 2,3…., 19.  pit is the closing price for the tth trading week.  
The benchmark-adjusted returns, arit, are calculated as the weekly raw 
return on the IPO stock i , rit, less the weekly benchmark index return for the 
corresponding period.  Ritter (1991) suggests the results could differ substantially 
depending on the benchmark.  Thus three different benchmark indices are used 
(TOPIX index, Nikkei 225 index,  JASDAQ index) as a robustness check. The 
residual, which is also known as an abnormal return (hereafter abnormal return), 
for IPO firm i for event week t, is defined as
arit =rit-rmt
where rmt is the return on the benchmark during the corresponding time period. 
Abnormal returns are averaged across an equally weighted portfolio of n firms 
for each week in event time to obtain the average abnormal return for the week, 
ARt.
ARt =   Σ   ar  .
The cumulative abnormal return for event week t, CARt , is defined as 
 CARt =Σj=2 ARj
Due to the short history of both exchanges we limit our aftermarket return 
analysis to 18 weeks.  We assume one week to be 5 trading days and the first 
1
n
n
i=1 it
t
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weekly return is recorded on the sixth trading day after the first closing price. 
Our sample consists of 87 firms (30 Mothers and 57 NASDAQ J).  Note the day 
count is based on the trading days and not on the calendar days.
The t-statistic for ARt is computed as           , where ARt denotes the 
average benchmark-adjusted return for event week t,  nt, is the number of 
observations in week t, and sdt is the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
benchmark-adjusted returns in week t. The t-statistic for the cumulative average 
adjusted return in week t, CARt is calculated as                , where nt is the number 
of firms trading in each week, and csdt is computed as  csdt = [t ･ var +2 ･ (t-1) 
･ cov]1/2 ,where var is the average of the cross sectional variance over the sample 
period of 18 weeks and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series.
Table 2:
Abnormal returns for Mothers IPOs from December 1999-March 2002
ARt   nt
sdt
√
CARt   nt
csdt
√
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Week of 
Seasoning
Number
of firms ARt t-stat
Nikkei 225-adjusted   TOPIX-adjusted   JASDAQ index-adjusted   
CARt t-stat ARt t-stat CARt t-stat ARt t-stat CARt t-stat
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
-0.05851
-0.02080
-0.00916
-0.00017
0.06159
0.06673
0.05658
-0.03122
0.01362
0.01318
-0.01794
-0.01403
0.02529
0.00907
-0.01230
0.00539
-0.01376
0.00429
-1.358 
-0.565 
-0.383 
-0.005 
1.696 
1.197 
1.363 
-0.940 
0.385 
0.471 
-1.153 
-0.727 
0.806 
0.299 
-0.571 
0.214 
-0.920 
0.174 
-0.05851 
-0.07931 
-0.08847 
-0.08865 
-0.02706 
0.03967 
0.09625 
0.06503 
0.07864 
0.09182 
0.07388 
0.05985 
0.08514 
0.09421 
0.08191 
0.08730 
0.07354 
0.07783 
-1.564 
-1.727 
-1.666 
-1.492 
-0.416 
0.564 
1.280 
0.815 
0.935 
1.041 
0.802 
0.624 
0.855 
0.914 
0.769 
0.796 
0.651 
0.671 
-0.06039
-0.02306
-0.01040
-0.00452
0.05758
0.06213
0.05903
-0.03458
0.00994
0.01065
-0.01873
-0.01516
0.02721
0.00567
-0.01229
0.00392
-0.01350
0.00029
-1.381 
-0.643 
-0.441 
-0.147 
1.570 
1.116 
1.411 
-1.006 
0.282 
0.385 
-1.197 
-0.798 
0.854 
0.186 
-0.571 
0.162 
-0.945 
0.012 
-0.06039 
-0.08345 
-0.09385 
-0.09837 
-0.04079 
0.02134 
0.08036 
0.04578 
0.05572 
0.06637 
0.04764 
0.03248 
0.05968 
0.06535 
0.05306 
0.05698 
0.04348 
0.04377 
-1.614 
-1.817 
-1.768 
-1.657 
-0.627 
0.303 
1.069 
0.574 
0.663 
0.753 
0.517 
0.339 
0.600 
0.634 
0.499 
0.520 
0.385 
0.377 
-0.05814
-0.01764
-0.00267
0.00356
0.04473
0.07464
0.06692
-0.02100
0.01023
0.01129
-0.01404
-0.00893
0.02120
0.00707
-0.00544
0.00949
-0.00953
0.00027
-1.384 
-0.495 
-0.105 
0.123 
1.245 
1.388 
1.609 
-0.618 
0.301 
0.439 
-0.801 
-0.521 
0.678 
0.240 
-0.268 
0.406 
-0.671 
0.011 
-0.05814 
-0.07577 
-0.07844 
-0.07488 
-0.03014 
0.04450 
0.11142 
0.09042 
0.10065 
0.11194 
0.09789 
0.08897 
0.11016 
0.11724 
0.11180 
0.12128 
0.11175 
0.11203 
-1.598 
-1.695 
-1.517 
-1.294 
-0.475 
0.649 
1.520 
1.163 
1.228 
1.302 
1.090 
0.951 
1.135 
1.167 
1.077 
1.134 
1.015 
0.990 
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Table 3:
Abnormal returns for NASDAQ-J  IPOs from June 2000-March 2002
Refer to Table 2 for explanation of notation. 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Week of 
Seasoning
Number
of firms ARt t-stat
Nikkei 225-adjusted   TOPIX-adjusted   JASDAQ index-adjusted   
CARt t-stat ARt t-stat CARt t-stat ARt t-stat CARt t-stat
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
-0.00682 
-0.01110 
-0.04569 
0.01365 
-0.00077 
0.03591 
0.04118 
-0.01585 
0.01799 
-0.01881 
-0.01559 
-0.02640 
-0.00429 
0.01552 
-0.00801 
-0.00669 
0.01134 
0.01153 
-0.196 
-0.639 
-3.376 
0.734 
-0.038 
1.699 
1.695 
-0.946 
0.990 
-1.064 
-1.057 
-1.615 
-0.264 
0.903 
-0.574 
-0.459 
0.736 
0.500 
-0.00682 
-0.01792 
-0.06362 
-0.04997 
-0.05074 
-0.01484 
0.02634 
0.01049 
0.02848 
0.00967 
-0.00592 
-0.03231 
-0.03661 
-0.02108 
-0.02910 
-0.03579 
-0.02445 
-0.01292 
-0.255 
-0.546 
-1.678 
-1.179 
-1.092 
-0.296 
0.491 
0.184 
0.475 
0.154 
-0.090 
-0.472 
-0.516 
-0.287 
-0.383 
-0.457 
-0.304 
-0.156 
-0.00927 
-0.01463 
-0.04622 
0.01429 
-0.00252 
0.03305 
0.04128 
-0.01541 
0.02129 
-0.02121 
-0.01252 
-0.02483 
-0.00961 
0.01734 
-0.00760 
-0.00858 
0.01008 
0.01178 
-0.265 
-0.847 
-3.448 
0.759 
-0.124 
1.574 
1.689 
-0.897 
1.161 
-1.235 
-0.872 
-1.502 
-0.580 
0.982 
-0.539 
-0.583 
0.652 
0.513 
-0.00927 
-0.02391 
-0.07013 
-0.05584 
-0.05836 
-0.02531 
0.01597 
0.00056 
0.02185 
0.00065 
-0.01188 
-0.03671 
-0.04632 
-0.02898 
-0.03657 
-0.04515 
-0.03507 
-0.02329 
-0.346 
-0.727 
-1.845 
-1.314 
-1.253 
-0.503 
0.297 
0.010 
0.363 
0.010 
-0.180 
-0.535 
-0.651 
-0.393 
-0.481 
-0.576 
-0.435 
-0.281 
-0.00599 
-0.01017 
-0.04053 
0.01517 
0.00343 
0.03218 
0.03647 
-0.01377 
0.02458 
-0.01499 
-0.01460 
-0.02716 
0.00374 
0.01343 
-0.01022 
-0.00542 
0.01023 
-0.00223 
-0.173 
-0.612 
-3.091 
0.809 
0.176 
1.724 
1.628 
-0.838 
1.417 
-0.915 
-1.071 
-1.734 
0.233 
0.823 
-0.859 
-0.415 
0.756 
-0.104 
-0.00599 
-0.01616 
-0.05670 
-0.04153 
-0.03810 
-0.00592 
0.03055 
0.01678 
0.04136 
0.02637 
0.01178 
-0.01538 
-0.01165 
0.00178 
-0.00844 
-0.01386 
-0.00363 
-0.00586 
-0.236 
-0.520 
-1.579 
-1.034 
-0.866 
-0.125 
0.601 
0.311 
0.728 
0.443 
0.189 
-0.237 
-0.173 
0.026 
-0.117 
-0.187 
-0.048 
-0.075 
ARt is the abnormal return and CARt is the cumulative abnormal return for week t.  Abnormal 
returns are computed relative to the Nikkei, TOPIX, and JASDAQ stock indices.  The t-statistic 
for the abnormal returns is  . The t-statistic for the 
abnormal returns is            .  The t-statist ic for cumulative average adjusted 
return in week t is                where csdt = [t ･ var +2 ･ (t-1) ･ cov]1/2, var is the 
average of the cross sectional variance over the sample period and cov is the first-order 
autocovariance of the ARt series. 
ARt   nt
sdt
√
CARt   nt
csdt
√
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Tables 2 and 3 report the average benchmark-adjusted returns (ARt) and 
the cumulative benchmark-adjusted returns (CARt) for both the Mothers and 
NASDAQ-J IPOs.  Relative to the JASDAQ index the CAR for Mothers and 
NASDAQ-J are 11% and –0.5% respectively, however, both figures are not 
statistically significant.  Overall we find the cumulative average residuals for the 
IPOs on both OTC markets are not statistically different from zero for the first 
19 weeks after listing.(2) The results are robust to the market index we use for 
adjusting the abnormal returns.  One exception is week four for the NASDAQ-J 
IPOs where the CAR is negative and statistically significant.  The long-run 
performance of IPOs is usually gauged on a monthly return basis over a period 
of several years thus making it difficult for us to facilitate a comparison of our 
findings with those in the existing published literature.  In general, however, 
most papers do not find statistically significant abnormal performance of IPOs 
relative to the market during the first one or two months [Hwang and Jayaraman 
(1995), Isobe, Ito, Kairys (1998) among others].  Thus the negative returns on 
the Mothers market during weeks 2-4, however, are not necessarily consistent 
with earlier findings on the Japanese market.  The statistically significant 
negative cumulative returns we observe during the early weeks of post listing 
could suggest a partial correction for the initial underpricing of the IPOs.  We 
should note, however, that the negative cumulative returns are substantially 
smaller than the initial returns.
 
4. Initial Return Regressions
As documented in the empirical IPO literature for many markets, we also 
find large positive average initial returns on both Mothers and NASDAQ-J (Table 
1).  On average we obtain a 39% initial return on Mothers and a 55% return 
on NASDAQ-J suggesting underpricing in the IPO market.  These figures are 
comparable with other studies.  For example,  Hiraki and  Hebner (1994) find a 
27% average initial return for OTC IPOs from 1984 to 1991.  And Isobe, Ito, and 
Kairys (1998) find a 41% raw average initial return for IPOs between 1975 and 
1989.
IPOs on the Japanese OTC Market
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To better understand the underpricing phenomena for IPOs on Mothers 
and NASDAQ-J, we regress the initial returns on a set of explanatory variables 
often cited in the empirical literature.  We focus our attention on three sets of 
the variables: 1) underwriter reputation, 2) uncertainty as proxied by the size of 
IPO proceeds and age of the firm, and 3) relevance of the industry factor. The 
regressions are similar in spirit to those found in Isobe, Ito, and Kairys (1998).
To test the relationship between the initial returns and underwriter 
reputation, we use a set of dummy variables. In one regression the dummy 
variable is set equal to one if the lead underwriter is not a major underwriter (IB). 
In a second regression we use separate dummies for three major underwriters: 
Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko-Salomon-Smith Barney (Nikko).  Booth and Smith 
(1986) suggest that weaker underwriters have an incentive to underprice in 
order to aggressively market their stocks.  This would mean we would expect a 
positive sign on the IB dummy and negative signs on the Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko 
dummy variables (relative to the constant term).
Our second interest is the relationship between the initial return and the 
degree of uncertainty perceived by the market.  As proxies for uncertainty, we 
use the log of proceeds and the age of the issuing firm.   Empirical studies have 
implied that higher the initial returns are associated with the risk of the firms 
going public.  Beatty and Ritter (1986), for example, suggest that the inverse of 
the IPO proceeds is a good proxy for ex ante uncertainty.  In other words, we 
would expect a negative relationship between initial returns and proceeds.  A 
firm with a longer history is thought to be less riskier than a firm with a short 
operating history.  Thus, we predict a negative relationship between initial 
returns and age of the firm as well.  
Thirdly, we use industry dummy variables for the service, manufacturing, 
and retail sectors.  This is to examine whether there is a tendency towards 
investor “fads” for a particular industry as often cited in the mass media.  In 
particular, investors who witness the large positive initial returns of high-tech or 
“new economy” firms in the U.S. could expect the same to occur in Japan with 
the inception of Mothers and NASDAQ-J. In our sample, the firms categorized 
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as “service” are more or less involved in business related to the internet.  
The initial return for IPO firm i, rio, is defined as the return from the 
offering price to the closing price on the first day of trading, or
rio = (pi0 – opi) / opi
where opi and pi0 are the offering price and the first closing price shortly after 
the public trading begins respectively.  These initial returns are regressed on a 
constant, underwriter dummy variable(s), natural log of IPO proceeds, age of the 
firm, and three industry dummy variables.  One of the cross-section regressions 
simply uses a single underwriter reputation dummy, IB.  The second regression 
employs three separate underwriter dummies for Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko.
IPOs on the Japanese OTC Market
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Table 4: Initial Return Regressions for IPOs on Mothers
________________________________________________________________
explanatory              estimated
variable              coefficient               t-statisitc              p-value
________________________________________________________________
Age   -0.0075  0.459  0.650
Proceeds  -0.0523  0.446  0.659
Service   -0.4922  1.461  0.155
Manufact.  -0.2252  0.407  0.687
Retail   -1.5317  2.247  0.033
IB Dummy   0.4700  1.409  0.170
Constant   0.9442  2.868  0.008
R2     0.122
________________________________________________________________
Age   -0.0075  0.459  0.650
Proceeds  -0.0523  0.466  0.659
Service   -0.4922  1.461  0.155
Manufact.  -0.2252  0.407  0.687
Retail   -1.5317  2.247  0.033
Nomura Dummy    0.4700  1.409  0.170
Daiwa Dummy  -0.1771  0.736  0.468
Nikko Dummy     1.595  2.189  0.037
Constant   0.5907  1.739  0.094
R2     0.283
________________________________________________________________
Sample size is 36. Age is the age of the firm since incorporation in number of years. Proceeds 
is the natural log of the proceeds at IPO (offering price times number shares issued). Service 
is the service industry dummy. Manufact. is the manufacturing industry dummy. Retail is 
the retail industry dummy. IB is dummy indicating underwriter is not a major underwriter. 
Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko are underwriter dummy variables. t-statistics obtained using White 
heteroskedastic consistent standard deviations.
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Table 5: Initial Return Regressions for IPOs on NASDAQ-J
________________________________________________________________
explanatory              estimated
variable              coefficient               t-statisitc              p-value
________________________________________________________________
Age   -0.0202  3.425  0.001
Proceeds  -0.2952  2.569  0.012
Service   -0.3993  1.278  0.205
Manufact.   0.1458  0.466  0.642
Retail   -0.2242  0.691  0.491
IB Dummy  -0.3949  1.766  0.081
Constant   1.3484  4.041  0.000
R2     0.207
________________________________________________________________
Age   -0.0205  3.384  0.001
Proceeds  -0.2857  2.559  0.012
Service   -0.4221  1.403  0.164
Manufact.   0.1379  0.445  0.657
Retail   -0.2434  0.771  0.443
Nomura Dummy    0.2824  1.220  0.226
Daiwa Dummy   0.3306  1.480  0.143
Nikko Dummy   0.5790  1.334  0.186
Constant   0.9792  3.323  0.001
R2     0.216
________________________________________________________________
IPOs on the Japanese OTC Market
Sample size is 91. See Table 1.
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Table 6: Initial Return Regressions for IPOs on Mothers and NASDAQ-J
________________________________________________________________
explanatory              estimated
variable              coefficient           t-statisitc                     p-value
________________________________________________________________
Age   -0.0174  3.126  0.002
Proceeds  -0.2269  2.706  0.008
Service   -0.3254  1.263  0.209
Manufact.   0.0985  0.285  0.776
Retail   -0.2209  0.777  0.438
IB Dummy  -0.4113  2.179  0.031
Constant   1.2013  4.391  0.000
R2     0.144
________________________________________________________________
Age   -0.0179  3.140  0.002
Proceeds  -0.2200  2.781  0.006
Service   -0.3588  1.458  0.148
Manufact.   0.0188  0.056  0.955
Retail   -0.2697  0.957  0.340
Nomura Dummy   0.3465  1.583  0.116
Daiwa Dummy   0.2404  1.195  0.234
Nikko Dummy   0.7583  2.007  0.047
Constant   0.8293  3.459  0.001
R2     0.168
________________________________________________________________
Sample size is 127. See Table 1.
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The estimates for the initial return regressions are presented in Tables 4 to 6. 
Linear cross-section regressions are run for the Mothers and NASDAQ-J samples 
separately (Tables 4 and 5) and then pooled in a third set of regressions (Table 6). 
Contrary to our initial prediction on underwriter reputation, we find the IB dummy 
variable to be negative and statistically significant for the NASDAQ-J sample. 
And the IB coefficient is not statistically significant for the Mothers sample.  The 
Nomura, Nikko, and Daiwa underwriter dummies are not statistically significant. 
One exception is the Nikko dummy for the Mothers sample.  Hence, our findings 
are mixed.  To an extent the results are consistent with Isobe, Ito, and Kairys 
(1998), and Beckman et. al. (2001) who do not find a statistically significant 
relationship between underwriter reputation dummy variables and initial returns. 
Yet, the statistically significant negative IB coefficient for the NASDAQ-J 
sample is puzzling.  One possible explanation could be that the investment banks 
leverage their monopsony power to underprice the IPOs so as to please important 
buy-side clients [Baron (1982) and Ritter (1984)].
For both OTC markets, the signs on the Age and Proceeds coefficients are 
negative as predicted.  The coefficients, however, are only statistically significant 
for the NASDAQ-J sample.  Overall this suggests that ex ante uncertainty plays 
a role in possibly explaining the underpricing documented on these two OTC 
markets.  Finally, the sector dummy variables are not statistically significant with 
the exception of the retail industry in the Mothers market.
5. Concluding Comments
This paper had the modest objective of documenting the underpricing 
phenomena and aftermarket performance of IPOs on two newly established 
Japanese OTC exchanges.  We find initial returns are related to underwriter 
reputation and ex ante uncertainty as proxied by IPO proceeds and firm age.  As 
the history of both the Mothers and NASDAQ-J exchanges is short, our data set 
is not long enough to conduct a thorough analysis of post listing performance. 
Yet given our limited data set we find little evidence of abnormal performance 
during the first 19 weeks of the aftermarket.
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Notes
(1)
(2)
Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) provide a comprehensive survey of the IPO empirical literature.
We have also extended the aftermarket sample period to 36 weeks. Preliminary findings for 
NASDAQ-J (reduced sample of 36) indicate little evidence of cumulative abnormal returns. 
On the other hand we find statistically significant negative cumulative returns for Mothers 
(reduced sample of 20) from around week 34.  As the sample size is small these results are 
not reported in the paper.
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＜　要　約　＞
　本研究ノートは、日本の店頭市場で新たに開設されたマザーズおよび NASDAQジャ
パンにおける IPO企業パフォーマンスの傾向を 1999年 12月から 2002年 8月までの
データを使用した実証研究分析を行った。その結果、上場初期に見られるリターンは、
株式引き受け企業の実績及び IPO後の企業指標の不確実性と相関を持っていることを
発見した。なお、IPO後の超過リターンは最初の 18週間では、検出することができ
なかった。
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